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Abstract:
 To understand why the Christian gospel has success amid one 
culture, while seeming to fail in similar, neighboring cultures, one must look 
to additional factors than those often cited by missionary sources. Some of 
these factors would include the socio -political and religious context of 
each of those cultures in question, in addition to the prior encounters with 
Christianity and the reactions to the gospel by the receiving cultures. To 
illustrate this need, this paper analyzes the contexts of Japan and Korea 
during the period of Japanese expansion and wartime (1894 – 1945), 
and looks specifically at what was happening in the other major religions 
present at the time (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism), which would 
include their responses to the Christian missionary presence.
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Introduction
 When considering the means used by the Holy Spirit in whether 
or not an individual, or an entire people group, accept the gospel and make 
it their own, missiologists often make it their focus to seek explanations 
that could explain why, historically, one embraces Christ, while another – 
presented with the same message, and sometimes even having similarities 
in methods used and situations experienced – rejects Christ. In the case 
of people groups, these same circumstances and prevailing worldview 
considerations also impact the shape of that Christianity that develops in 
the local context, as it becomes embraced and indigenized. 
 This essay will look specifically at two nations – Japan and Korea 
– to compare their relative responses to the Christian gospel. These two 
nations, despite the similarities and connections with one another as fellow 
East Asian nations, have had radically different reactions to Christianity 
– Japan predominantly rejecting its claims, and Korea – especially in the 
South – embracing Christianity and eventually becoming a major player in 
Christian missions.
 While there are significant factors that developed later on 
historically, in addition to cultural and theological factors that must also be 
considered, this paper will specifically analyze this question through the 
lens of the other major religions that surrounded the churches during the 
period of Japanese expansion and wartime (1894 – 1945), at which time the 
general trajectory of Christianity in both countries seemed to diverge and 
move in opposite directions. 
 Prior to this period, there were several parallel similarities between 
the two countries regarding their general response to Christianity. Roman 
Catholic missionaries had been active on Japan’s shores in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and in Korea, during the eighteenth century. 
Both nations would initially welcome this new faith with curiosity toward 
its differences, and yet both would later become scandalized by Catholic 
Christianity and close their borders to foreigners as a result, expelling 
all missionaries and persecuting the native Christians, thus causing the 
fledgling church in each nation to go underground.1 Both nations later had 
their borders forcibly opened through gunboat diplomacy in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, followed soon after by the arrival of Protestant 
missionaries and the return of Roman Catholicism. Also, both had an initial 
period where conversion to the new faith was officially forbidden, which 
was later removed. Finally, both had been experiencing a period of rapid 
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church growth immediately preceding this period in question. Yet, beginning 
in the 1890’s, things would change. While Christianity would continue to 
experience rapid growth in Korea, it would become marginalized in Japan. 
Why did this change occur?
 One possible explanation is to explore what was happening 
among Christianity’s major opponents (namely, Buddhism, Shintoism, and 
Confucianism) during this time period, specifically at their response to the 
presence and activity of Christianity. For this, I will address each religion 
in turn, discussing the context of each, as well as how it responded to 
Christianity, in hope that this could contribute to the discussion on why 
Christianity seemed to blossom in Korean soil, but wither in Japan.
Buddhism
 At the beginning of this period, Buddhism in both Korea and Japan 
was in a weak and demoralized state. In Japan’s case, while it enjoyed 
a prominent role under the previous government, it was in a state of 
disfavor with the new Meiji government. In addition to this, it found itself 
divided into numerous competing sects. In Korea, Buddhism had been 
marginalized since the fourteenth century. However, this would change in 
the later nineteenth century, as Buddhists from both Japan and Korea, like 
other nations across the Buddhist Asian world, would seek to reform their 
religion.
Global Buddhist Reinvention
 On the global level in the nineteenth century, Buddhism was 
seeking to reinvent itself as an historically and scientifically based religion, 
in response to the aggressive mission efforts of Christians in many of the 
Buddhist territories. Thus, there was a desire by Buddhists throughout Asia 
to prevent themselves from losing too much ground to its very aggressively 
evangelistic competitor.2 The specific developments centred on establishing 
Siddhartha Gautama, also known as Sakyamuni, the historical Buddha, as 
the centre of Buddhism. This became a focal point in Buddhist discourse in 
response to a similar emphasis being proclaimed by Christian missionaries 
when discussing the historicity of Jesus.3 
 According to Hwansoo Kim, the efforts to revive Buddhism 
on a global level were “spearheaded by a range of actors from the West 
and the East, including Western Orientalists, Buddhist sympathizers, and 
Asian Buddhist reformers.”4 Of these, the two with the greatest impact 
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were Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832-1907), one of the founders of 
the Theosophist Society and the first Western convert to Buddhism, and 
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), a lay Buddhist reformer from Sri 
Lanka.5 Because of increasing travel and communication between the 
different Buddhist regions throughout Asia at this time, as well as the 
sympathetic attitudes of  Orientalists and Buddha sympathizers in the West, 
local practices and responses to Western colonialism and Christianity 
began to affect other regions, which would also result in adaptations in the 
self-consciousness of Buddhism itself.6
 As part of these reclamation efforts, Dharmapala and others, 
Olcott included, visited Japan, Korea, and other locations within the 
Asian Buddhist world to unite Buddhists under the banner of the historical 
Buddha, with the ultimate goal being the expulsion of Christian missionaries 
from their collective territories.7 The Buddha’s birthday celebration was one 
campaign that successfully helped to generate the rise of Buddhism as a 
revived global religion. According to Hwansoo Kim, Japan would become 
particularly dedicated to promoting this festival. 8
Buddhism in Japan
 Not only would Japanese Buddhism become passionately devoted 
to the celebration of Buddha’s Birthday (called Hana Matsuri in Japan); they 
would also send individual travellers to other parts of Asia, as explorers, 
missionaries, and even a delegation to the World Parliament of Religions 
conference in 1893, and repurpose a document written by a Christian into 
an apologetic argument about the West’s fascination with Buddhism (and, 
with it, the loss of Western interest in Christianity).
 Prior to the renovations in Buddhism happening during this 
modernization process, the Japanese Buddha’s Birthday celebration had 
occurred inside Buddhist temples, similar to other locations in Asia. The 
celebration was also generally held according to the older lunar calendar. 
However, after the renovation, with the encouragement of Olcott and 
Dharmapala, the festivals began to be held in public streets, university 
campuses, and private institutes, and the lunar calendar was replaced by the 
solar Gregorian calendar. Initially, it was run by Buddhist youth groups, with 
no official backing from the various Buddhist sects. This changed in 1916, 
however, when the Japanese Buddhists finally united for the celebration.9 
By 1926, Hana Matsuri was embraced by the Japanese government as one 
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of the symbols indicating Japan as the ideal leader of Asia and a prominent 
player in the political and religious arena of the world.10
 An additional resource that the Japanese Buddhists used to re-
establish themselves within their society was The Gospel of Buddha, a 
publication by a German-American Christian author, Paul Carus. Carus’ 
original intent with this work was to propagate his version of Christianity 
as being the fulfillment of Buddhism’s aspirations, with Jesus being the 
Maitreya – the final great teacher to fulfil the teachings of Buddhism. 
Carus described Buddhism as a predecessor to Christianity, as well as a 
prominent contender for the souls of the world,  which should be learned 
from as a highly philosophical and scientific faith.11 He had, in fact, been 
highly impressed by the presentation of Eastern Buddhism by the Japanese 
delegates at the World Parliament of Religions conference a few years 
before publishing his work. According to Judith Snodgrass, “the Buddhism 
they presented… was a rationalized, secular, trans-sectarian, lay-oriented 
Buddhism consciously packaged to emphasize its compatibility with 
science and philosophy… and the life-affirming and humanitarian aspects 
of Buddhism.”12 In his work, Carus presented his views of the natural 
evolution of religion (a popular view of the time), with Buddhism naturally 
giving way to Christianity, its fulfilment. 
 However, this was not how it was interpreted nor used by the 
Japanese Buddhists. Instead, they used it as an apologetic tool to point toward 
how Westerners (who were viewed by Japanese as being predominantly 
Christian) were developing a deep interest in Buddhism (thus, losing faith in 
Christianity), and that Buddhism of the East could pose a threat to Christian 
(Western) religious hegemony. In other words, it was used to convince 
those Japanese who had been drawn toward Christianity because of the 
technological superiority of the West to reconsider their previous decisions 
to embrace that new faith, and as part of an argument that Japan could be 
recognized as an equal to the West in science, technology and intellect, 
but needed to remain strong as a decidedly Eastern culture against Western 
spiritual dominance.13 In other words, despite Carus’s original intent for the 
Gospel of Buddha, it was used in Japan, as elsewhere, as an ingredient in 
the reformulation and rebranding of Buddhism as a modern, scientific, and 
philosophically sophisticated religion.
 Part of the reason for this desire for Buddhism to reinvent itself 
in Japan was that with the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the 
restoration of imperial rule in the new Meiji government, Buddhism as a 
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faith found itself both deeply divided and radically out of favor. According 
to Richard Jaffe, “although the Tokugawa regime had regarded the Buddhist 
clergy as a crucial aide in the maintenance of religious and social order, 
nativists, Shintoists, and many members of the new Meiji regime demonized 
them as un-Japanese, parasitic, and corrupt.”14 It was also viewed by the 
Meiji government as being a “feudal and superstitious religion antithetical 
to modernization and Westernization.”15  As such, the Meiji government 
sought to eliminate Japanese Buddhism altogether. It was out of this context 
that Japanese Buddhism now began to look outside of itself – especially 
since commercial shipping with other nations were opening Japan up to the 
world – to reimagine a Buddhism that would once again thrive in a rapidly 
changing Japan.16 Among many of these travellers from Japan to the rest of 
Asia, the plight of several of these other nations, especially those under the 
heels of Western imperialists, caused a realization that unless they learned 
to successfully compete with the so-called Christian world, they would 
suffer the same fate of servility to the arrogance and brutality of Western 
rulers.17
Buddhism in Korea
 Like its Japanese counterpart, Buddhism in Korea was in need 
of a re-invention of itself. During the Joseon period (1392-1910), it had 
found itself relegated to isolated mountain monasteries, and was prevented 
access from the principle avenues of power.18 Additionally, the tradition of 
Buddhism within Korea itself was divided between complete detachment 
from the everyday lives of the people, with an “elitist, clergy-centred 
institutional tradition” on the one hand, and “diffused, ‘shamanistic’ 
religious practices” of lay Buddhists on the other.19 To a degree, the anti-
Buddhist sentiments during the Joseon period could be partly to blame for 
this situation. However, it should also be noted that the impediments that 
the Buddhist reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
sought to address were actually inherent, structurally, within Buddhism 
itself – particularly of the Son school, which was the most prominent in 
Korea at this time.20 As a system, Son Buddhism focusses on meditative 
practices and the denial of the physical world for the sake of the spiritual, 
not on the public teaching of doctrine. It was this world-denial and nihilism 
that resulted in some of Neo-Confucianism’s deepest criticisms of that 
religion, which then led to its earlier marginalization.21
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 The Buddha’s Birthday celebration in Korea first developed during 
the Koryo period. They were originally state-sponsored events with the 
intention of national unity and communal prayers for the royal family. The 
event included a lantern festival, celebrated by lighting lanterns and reading 
Buddhist sutras. Despite the anti-Buddhist policies of the Joseon period, 
the festival survived, though stripped of its Buddhist meanings. It became 
more like a State holiday, where families would gather at the festival, light 
lanterns and entertain themselves in the commercial districts.22 However, 
from the later nineteenth century, similar to their Japanese counterparts, 
Korean Buddhist monks began to study in other parts of Asia, especially 
China and Japan, and several of these reformers emphasized the centrality 
of the historical Buddha, which included a resuscitation of the Buddha’s 
Birthday celebration.23 According to Hwansoo Kim, Korea’s native version 
of this holiday was already undergoing modernization before Japanese 
Buddhists began introducing their own version to the peninsula.24
 Into this situation, during the period of Japanese expansion, 
various Japanese Buddhist sects sent missionaries to proselytize, each 
competing with one another for a piece of the Korean Buddhist pie. The 
relationship between Japanese and Korean Buddhists during this time 
of Japanese expansionism was anything but one of trust or confidence 
between the two sides. To the Koreans, Japanese Buddhists were likened to 
Christian missionary colonialists “who invaded non-Western countries with 
the objective of furthering their sectarian and nation’s imperial ambitions.”25 
Japanese Buddhists, for their part, viewed their Korean counterparts as 
“pre-modern, moribund, backward and antisocial,” and in serious need 
of guidance from their more “modern, vibrant, reformed and socially 
engaged” version of Buddhism that was developing in Japan.26 However, it 
was not necessarily as clear-cut as a relationship of rivalry or patronizing. 
 If anything, the relationships between Korean and Japanese 
Buddhists was more passive – with Japanese Buddhists acting, for the most 
part, more like colonialists, with little interest in promoting the Buddhism of 
their neighboring nation. Koreans, for their part, were embittered because 
of the foreign rule, and did not wish to associate with foreign invaders.27 
Additionally, with the introduction of the Temple Ordinance in 1911, the 
Japanese government effectively put an end to the sectarian competition 
among Japanese Buddhists over Korean Buddhist territory by bringing the 
administration of Korean Buddhism directly under the supervision of the 
colonial government.28
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 However, there were some exceptions to the policy of 
disengagement. According to Hwansoo Kim, there were some on both 
sides who desired to work closer together toward mutual understanding 
and benefit.29 The Japanese, for their part, assisted Korean monasteries in 
establishing schools, creating a central office for the monitoring of Korean 
Buddhism, aiding Korean Buddhism in re-establishing itself into the center 
of Korean politics, and protecting them from exploitation. Meanwhile, 
Korean Buddhists were encouraged by their situations and by zealous 
Japanese Buddhist missionaries (who were themselves inspired by their 
nation’s imperial powers and their opposition to the threat posed by 
Christianity) to join the Japanese sects that protected them.30 In other words, 
the relationship between Korean Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism during 
this period was highly dynamic and nuanced.
 Another proof that the relationship between the Buddhist camps 
was not completely antagonistic would be the March 1 Movement. Unlike 
Korean Christians and the Ch’ondogyo (The Heavenly Way Religion), 
who were vocal supporters of Korean independence, only two among the 
leaders of the March 1 Independence Movement were Buddhists.31 What 
could be seen, by contrast, is a relationship of protection and control by 
the Japanese authorities toward Korean Buddhism, which allowed them 
greater freedom and public visibility than under the previous dynasty.32 
This increased visibility, protection from the Japanese government (as 
Buddhism was recognized as a legitimate religion – alongside Christianity 
and Shintoism), and its renewed image as an indigenous/ Eastern religion 
(as opposed to Christianity, which was still seen as relatively foreign) made 
it possible for Korean Buddhism to expand its influence.33
Shintoism
 During the later Meiji Restoration in Japan and subsequent period 
of expansionism, Shintoism, was also in the process of transforming itself. 
This was due, to some degree, by the anxiety felt in Japan about the growing 
influence of Christianity and its accompanying Western colonial powers, 
and the desire to remain strong as a nation against Western dominance. 
For this paper, I will be specifically analyzing the particular form of 
Shintoism that was emerging: State Shintoism, its status as a “non-religious” 
nationalistic religion of the Japanese Empire, and the enforcement of its 
shrine worship upon the Christian churches in Korea.
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State Shintoism in Japan
 In one form or another, Shintoism had existed in Japan since 
ancient times. However, as a religion, it lacked a unifying ideology. 
Throughout much of its known history, it has existed in syncretism with 
other, more dominant, faiths – Buddhism during the medieval period, and, 
from the seventeenth century, Neo-Confucianism. Similar to its relationship 
with Buddhism, Shintoism altered Neo-Confucianism as it joined itself to 
its ethical ideology. In addition to this, as Japan expanded its territory, it 
would combine these elements with a totalitarian governmental policy 
and dreams of unifying the peoples of Eastern Asia, in direct opposition 
and competition with the Western Allied Powers, something referred to 
by scholars as Pan-Asianism.34 This Imperial Confucianism (Kodo Jugaku) 
would be the dominant form of State Shinto religion until the fall of the 
Japanese Empire in 1945.35 According to Wonsuk Chang, “In the wake of 
Perry’s expedition to Japan… Japan transformed itself along the Western 
model of the aggressive nation state” and “defined itself as a paradox, part 
of a larger community of oppressed Asian nations standing against Western 
hegemony, while also being the most Westernized, civilized country among 
the Asian nations.”36 
 To accomplish this dream of a Pan-Asian empire, the Japanese 
state sought to unite various elements of Japanese culture, including the 
semi-autonomous system of Shrine Shintoism, into a newly structured 
state religion.37 Specifically, it was these three contents of Shrine Shintoism 
that the State sought to capitalize on: the myth of the eternal reign of the 
imperial family, the central importance of the kami (Divine spirits/ gods), 
particularly Amaterasu, the sun goddess thought to be the divine ancestor 
of the emperor, and Japan’s superiority over other nations.38 In fact, the 
Shintoism of the early 20th Century assumed a world dominated by Japan, 
and that other lands, including China, (which was previously viewed as the 
primary center of civilization in the East Asian milieu) would pay tribute to 
Japan.39
 Between 1868 and 1945, Shintoism increasingly became 
influenced and controlled by the state, as the Japanese government sought 
to utilize the beliefs already inherent in Shintoism, in addition to the worship 
at Shinto’s shrines, as one of the principle driving forces behind galvanizing 
the loyalty of the Japanese populace to the Japanese imperial ambitions.40 
Wilbur Fridell also mentions certain other elements that existed outside of 
traditional Shinto discourse that were central elements to the State Shinto 
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apparatus (such as national holidays, the national Meiji Constitution, and 
the Imperial Rescript on Education).41 In other words, the religion known 
as Shinto (shrine Shinto) was only one of several elements that were being 
used by the Japanese government to accomplish this development of the 
Imperial Shinto system.42
 With this all being said, it was not simply a top-down campaign 
propagated by a power-hungry government. On the contrary, the people of 
Japan in that period seemed to actively embrace this initiative.43 According 
to Shimazono Susumu, “people at all levels of society can be viewed as 
active participants in State Shinto, supporting and rallying around it.”44 As he 
continues, however, he points out that the institutional State Shinto, aligned 
with the militarist, totalitarian ideologues of the Imperial State, and the Shrine 
Shinto of the common people, which represents the religious side of Shinto, 
were not always in complete agreement.45 Additionally, while the State did 
have some forms of control and oversight over the shrine system during this 
period (under a different arm of the government than “religions,” such as 
Christianity and Buddhism), the shrines under the government during that 
period remained relatively weak, both economically and politically.46 What 
we can get from this is that the religion of Shintoism and the Shintoism of 
the State, while related to one another, were not equivalent.
 However, because the religious worldview known as Shinto was 
one aspect of the picture that was being formed by the Japanese government 
in the development of State Shinto, seeking to define Shintoism as a religion 
is a murky undertaking at best – especially since the self-identification of 
Shintoism at that time in question (and also, in some ways, even today) 
was one more of nationalistic patriotism and expressions of Japanese 
culture, much like the rituals and holidays that citizens of another country 
would perform at certain specified occasions.47 It was this “non-religious” 
nationalistic patriotism that would cause problems in Japan’s colonies, 
including Korea, particularly for the nascent Christian church.
The Shinto Shrine Controversy in Korea
 Although it may be true that Christianity was officially protected 
as a legal religion during the Colonial period, the reality of the relationship 
between the Japanese Shinto state and the Christian church was somewhat 
convoluted and opaque. For instance, only native Korean Christians were 
prominent in the March 1 Independence movement (while the Western 
missionaries actually discouraged this political activity). However, these 
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same missionaries, although uninvolved in the movement itself, drew global 
attention and criticism from their worldwide sources toward the atrocities 
committed by the Japanese in its aftermath.48 Also, because Christianity was 
already deeply entrenched in Korea by the time Japan officially annexed 
Korea in 1910, the missionaries were able to attain certain concessions to 
further expand their presence through education, healthcare, and social 
work in the peninsula, especially in the major city centers.49 For the most 
part, Western Christian missionaries hoped to maintain good relationships 
with the Japanese by expressing support for colonial rule – which is 
part of the reason for why, despite Korean Christians’ prominence in the 
Independence Movement, the missionaries were, for the most part, silent 
until the aftermath.50 This, alongside other controversial incidents, should 
illustrate the convoluted history of missionary Christianity in Korea during 
this period. 
 This opaque understanding would only become more 
pronounced in the later years of the Colonial period, and these two forces 
(Christianity and State Shinto) would come into direct confrontation with 
one another. The Manchurian Incident, a battle pretexting Japan’s invasion 
of Northeastern China, produced the need in the Japanese government’s 
minds for increasing the intensity of the “Japanization” of Korea. Japan 
needed the material and human resources present in Korea, in addition to 
the strategic position of the peninsula in their expansionist thrust. For this, 
they needed to guarantee the loyalty of their Korean subjects.51 They sought 
to do this by urging the Korean population, at any cost, to offer worship and 
reverence at the Shinto shrines. Prior to 1932, these rites were completely 
optional; however, beginning in 1932, all school personnel – principals, 
teachers, and students – were now required to attend and participate in 
ceremonies at Shinto shrines and pay special homage and reverence toward 
the Japanese emperor.52
 Because education was one of the primary ministries of Christian 
missionaries in Korea, this would become problematic. In fact, one could 
argue that this was the issue among Christians in Korea at the time, and 
one of the primary reasons for the later factionalization of the church. On 
the one hand, it was required by the government, who had been insisting 
since 1900 that the shrine worship “was not a religious act, but a political 
expression of patriotism,”53 and the American missionaries wished to remain 
on friendly terms with the Japanese, so that they could continue operating 
in the peninsula. At the same time, it was also viewed by several Christians 
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as being a form of religious observance and, thus, idolatry, especially given 
the difference between the monotheism declared in Christianity and the 
polytheism inherent in Shintoism.  Naturally, this would cause division 
in the ranks among the Christian denominations – with the Catholics and 
Methodists, for the most part, cooperating (thus, being allowed to keep 
their schools operational), while the Presbyterians were divided between 
a minority who also participated and a majority that refused to cooperate 
(and closed their schools).54 The other Protestant denominations represented 
in Korea, whose numbers were not as significant as those mentioned, 
generally went one way or the other. 
 At least part of the reason for this divide that seemingly split 
across denominational lines could be attributed to church governance 
structures of the denominations in question. For the Catholics, because 
the Pope declared it acceptable, the church followed his lead.55 Likewise, 
because the Methodists also possessed an episcopal governance structure, 
the denomination generally went in the direction decided by the bishops, 
despite any misgivings of individuals within the denomination.56 Among the 
Presbyterians, on the other hand, who participated in a more egalitarian, 
consular form of church government, determined by regions, this gave more 
independence to each regional body, which allowed for more voices of 
dissent to be heard.57 Additionally, while the Presbyterians were generally 
more exclusivist in their approach to other religions, the Methodists and 
Catholics were usually more inclusivist and sympathetic.58
Confucianism
 During the Joseon Dynasty in what is today Korea, Neo-
Confucianism enjoyed both popularity and prestige. In fact, it was the 
dominant ideology of the time, and the Korean Confucian Scholarly 
class (the Yangban) took great pride in their loyalty to Neo-Confucian 
doctrines and social ethics. The government examination system had 
become so perfected that, unlike in the Chinese system, the adoption of 
Neo-Confucianism and everything accompanying it served to preserve the 
stability of the Korean society.59 In fact, it was even believed by some that 
Joseon was the only remaining true heir of the Confucian tradition that it 
had inherited from China.60 However, this changed drastically when Japan 
annexed Korea in 1910. Almost overnight, Confucianism was deprived of 
its previous monopolizing position in the official courts of the land and had 
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lost considerable societal power.61 While its influence on Korean society 
didn’t die out completely (as it continued to live on in the rural centers, 
and Korean cultural mores, language, and even Korean Christianity, 
have all retained certain aspects of Confucianism), its official powers as 
an institution were essentially stripped away. However, the seeds for this 
dissolution were present before that final point.
 Consider, for example, the perspective taken by the Japanese 
toward Confucianism itself, despite the fact that State Shinto used Confucian 
ethics as part of its ideological makeup during this time. To the Japanese 
mind, which at this point was focussed on expansion and advancement 
to compete effectively with Western powers, pure Confucianism and its 
focus on the past and contradictory emphases and influences were seen 
as central to the problem of what Japan perceived as backwardness in its 
peninsular neighbor.62 In fact, there was even a sense of Japanese superiority 
because of the relative peace enjoyed by her people, politically, especially 
when comparing itself to that of China, the epicenter of Confucianism. 
This comparison is especially stark when the central Shinto belief of the 
unbroken lineage of their emperors is considered, when compared to the 
changing dynasties of both Korea and China (who were both nations that 
based their political philosophy on Confucianism).63 
 As Wonsuk Chang would point out, even among intellectuals in 
Korea at the time, Confucianism was already beginning to be seen in a less 
than ideal light. It was viewed as “a shackling ideology of backwardness, 
oppression, hierarchism, laziness, and hypocrisy, and thereby incompatible 
with modern values such as individualism, tolerance and freedom.”64 It was 
increasingly seen as being powerless and useless.
 Additionally, this perception would only be exasperated if one 
were to reflect upon the events surrounding the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), when Japan defeated the Chinese forces in a series of battles for 
the control of the peninsula, as well as the series of failed rebellions and 
coups by those of the more conservative Confucian factions.65 When 
coupling this with the introduction of Christianity and Western culture 
at around the same time, this would result in a perfect storm against the 
Confucian ideology. Each of these factors, when combined with the loss of 
Confucianism’s state prominence and the impact of modernism on Korean 
society, has resulted in Confucianism becoming marginalized, with very 
few Koreans after that point claiming any religious allegiance toward it.66 
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However, while Confucianism as a specific movement or “religion” may 
have become marginalized in both countries, its values continue to live on 
in the South Korean and Japanese cultures of today. 
Changes Brought by Christianity
 The introduction of Protestant Christianity into both Japan and 
Korea in the latter half of the nineteenth century brought considerable 
change to both contexts. Quite significant was the alteration to the 
religious environment, especially as each of the religions covered above 
were forced to deal not only with a new contender to the religious scene, 
accompanying the technologically and militarily superior Western powers, 
but also a new way to think about religion itself. To a lesser degree, we 
could see this change already happening with the earlier introduction 
of Catholicism67 It was actually the introduction of Christianity, with its 
emphasis on denominationalism and religious exclusivism that would 
result in an alteration in this understanding of religion. 
A Changed Perspective on Religion
 The traditional belief structure of the East Asian world did not 
think of religions in the way that we would in the Western world. In fact, the 
idea of “religion” as a distinct preference and experience of an individual 
was foreign to Eastern Asia until the advent of Christianity arriving at its 
shores. In fact, it would not have been unheard of for a person to believe in 
and practice Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism (Japan)/ Shamanism 
(Korea) within the same day and not feel the contradiction. Every “religion” 
had its distinct role to play in the society in both Korea and Japan. In 
other words, at least as far as Japan and Korea of that time period were 
concerned, this particular concept of “religion” was a product of modern 
Western civilization.68 Curiously, we can see this even in new religions that 
developed as blends of Catholicism and local religious beliefs during the 
period of persecution in each country: the Kakure Kirishitan in Japan and 
the Ch’ondogyo in Korea.
 One of the surprises that the Christian missionaries found in Japan 
was that the Kakure Kirishitan, the underground church, had survived, 
despite the persecution, changed through centuries of isolation, and was 
now re-emerging.69 Some of these “hidden Christians” would later join 
either Catholic or Protestant churches; however, approximately 35,000 of 
them would refuse to join either church, and instead chose to keep their 
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own traditions alive.70 Currently, there are very few of these individuals 
left. The majority of these live in poor farming and fishing villages around 
Kyushu and its offshore islands.71 Of particular interest to this paper are the 
reasons why those underground Christians chose to remain separate.
 The Kakure Kirishitan beliefs are a unique blend of Christianity 
with Japanese folk Shinto and Buddhism.72 That they would blend the 
Catholic traditions with the indigenous ones is understandable. The official 
church leadership was expelled relatively early on, and without access to 
doctrinal resources and fearful of persecution, these Christians needed to 
hide their faith by changing their symbolism and hiding their beliefs in the 
cultural forms of their surrounding culture.73 As for why they choose to 
remain separate today, much of this has to do with honoring the tradition 
of the past and the veneration of their ancestors, who willingly suffered as 
Christians during the period of persecution. Additionally, as Kristian Pella 
points out, they are more a Japanese Shinto-Buddhist tradition that has 
incorporated Christian symbols than a completely Christian sect – and thus 
an entity that would differ in teaching and appearance from other Christian 
denominations, including those that would later attempt to create a fully 
indigenous form of Christianity in Japan.74
 Similar to the Kakure Kirishitan of Japan, the Ch’ondogyo (the 
Heavenly Way) sect of Korea (also known as Tonghak, or Eastern Learning) 
also developed as a blending of Catholic ideas with the native Confucian, 
Buddhist, and Shamanist notions. Ch’oe Che-u (1824-1864), the illegitimate 
son of an aristocrat, developed this faith in response to the corruption of the 
government, incorporating the Christian concepts of equality, the Kingdom 
of Heaven and the personality of God into a reformed Confucian-based 
sect.75 It would be a splinter from this group that would incite a general 
rebellion in Korea in 1894 that triggered the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), which, in turn, would begin the process of Japanese colonization of 
the peninsula.76
 This blending with the indigenous tradition is not unique in either 
Japanese nor Korean histories. In Japan, Buddhism, which was introduced 
through Korea in the mid sixth century CE, and Confucianism, which 
also entered Japan through Korea in the third century, were both able to 
reconcile themselves to the native Japanese Shintoism by adopting specific 
roles within Japanese society.77 The Japanese Emperor Shotoku (574-621) 
reportedly related the three religions as being the root (Shinto), the trunk 
(Confucianism) and the branches (Buddhism) of the tree representing 
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Japanese culture, seeking to bring peace to his divided nation. Likewise, 
Korea had a similar tradition, but where Confucianism and Buddhism co-
existed until the thirteenth century, when Neo-Confucianism became the 
dominant worldview, and other religions – Buddhism included – were 
molded to fit the needs and dictates of the Confucian royalty.78
 This is one element of the general attitude toward religion 
historically within East Asia, particularly both in Japan and Korea – that 
different religions do not need to be mutually exclusive from one another.79 
In fact, one might even say that the folk religion practiced in both Korea 
and Japan was a blend of Confucian ethics, Buddhist reflection, and local 
ideologies (whether Shintoism in Japan or Shamanism in Korea). 
Conclusion
 As I have argued in this paper, the introduction of Protestant 
Christianity, accompanied by the technologically and militarily superior 
Western empires, to the East Asian region brought considerable change. 
In addition to dealing with a new way of understanding religion, there was 
also the specific threat felt by each of these religions by Christianity itself 
– a religion that, to their eyes at least, was an aggressively competitive 
newcomer to the religious scene. In many ways, this is where we can begin 
to see a difference in the relative response between the dominant religions 
in both nations that would also determine a difference in the response 
between Japan and Korea toward Christianity itself. As I have shown above, 
both Buddhism and Shintoism seemed to expand and revitalize themselves 
in this period, yet Confucianism seemed to wither into the background. 
 Regarding Buddhism, its revival in both contexts was, in many 
ways, part of a global movement, and while it did expand its influence in 
both Japan and Korea, it was expanding from a place of weakness in both 
contexts, and so was not able to fully expel Christianity. This perceived 
failure would prove to be a point of frustration for various Buddhist 
leaders – most notably in the difference in social engagement and zeal 
for outside proselytizing (active evangelism of nonbelievers) among their 
missionaries.80 Nevertheless, although not becoming primarily dominant in 
either of the two contexts, Buddhism would grow in influence as it sought 
to re-invent itself and become truly competitive in light of the threat that it 
perceived from Christianity.
 However, it is in the difference between Shintoism in Japan 
and Confucianism in Korea where one can see at least one clue as to the 
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difference in responses toward Christianity. Between 1873 and the early 
1890’s, Christianity in Japan became highly popular and influential, with 
prominent members of the samurai and scholarly classes declaring it the 
fulfilment of the Japanese bushido honor codes and beneficial for Japan to 
embrace collectively.81 In the midst of this time of great popularity, Christian 
missionaries expressed great optimism about the future of Christianity in 
Japan.  However, in the mid 1890’s, this would change considerably. Part 
of this change may have been due to the Buddhist revival, but what would 
become apparent, especially as Japan began to extend their territory, was 
that Shintoism, in transforming itself and joining itself to the identity of 
the Japanese culture and empire, was beginning to reassert itself as the 
official and dominant faith, and Christianity, which had come to symbolize 
Western global hegemony, and yet was becoming seen by these same 
Japanese intellectuals as being rejected in the West as well, was pushed 
to the side and rejected by the majority of Japanese as utterly foreign, anti-
patriotic, and inferior.
 Meanwhile, when looking at the Korean scene, the situation 
developed completely differently. The aggressor was not perceived as 
the Christian West, but Shinto Japan. When the political power was 
stripped from the Neo-Confucian scholar class upon Japan’s annexation, 
Confucianism seemed to melt away under Japanese criticism. However, 
why was there not a similar resurgence of the native religion in Korea, like 
there had been in Japan? After all, there were other religions to choose from 
– most notably the Chon’dogyo, which had become highly popular among 
the common classes. At least part of this was the Japanese policy toward 
religion in its colonies. Unlike Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and 
Christianity, Chon’dogyo and other native religions of Korea were simply 
not recognized as legitimate religions, and so became illegal during the 
Colonial period. In addition, the Koreans believed that the United States 
(the nation most closely associated with Christian missionaries in the minds 
of Koreans) lacked colonial intentions toward Korea.82 Thus, to belong to a 
religion that promised a chance to keep their national identity (which was 
not compromised by collusion with the Japanese Imperialists), and which 
promised progressive change from a decaying and corrupt system of the 
past, Christianity became an obvious choice for many.83 We can see this 
during the Great Revival of 1907, in addition to the March 19 Independence 
Movement, as well as the rapid growth of numbers during the entire 
Colonial period – growing from one percent of the total population in 1910 
52    The Asbury Journal    76/1 (2021)
(which had already shown significant growth and popularity prior to this), 
to just under four percent in 1945, following liberation from Japan.84
 In other words, these religious movements show us at least one 
clue as to the difference between these two nations in their response to 
Christianity. In Japan, the combination of Buddhist revival and the rise of 
State Shinto as the official faith of nationalistic loyalty would marginalize 
Christianity as foreign and unpatriotic. In Korea, meanwhile, even with the 
dominance of Shintoism as the religion of the occupying Japanese Empire, 
and even with the increased popularity and prominence of Buddhism in 
this period, many Koreans would ultimately see Christianity as the best 
alternative that would allow them to keep their national identity as a people.
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